ALTERNATIVE MARKETS UPDATE – END APRIL 2026

​Since the beginning of 2026, geopolitics has increasingly moved back to the centre of financial-market risk, led by the escalation between the US and Iran. The conflict has shifted from a regional military confrontation into a broader threat to global trade infrastructure, with Iran using asymmetric naval tactics, including fast boats, vessel seizures and threats around the Strait of Hormuz, while the US has responded with a naval blockade and efforts to secure maritime corridors. Shipping traffic through the strait has fallen sharply, with reports indicating that only a few ships passed through the waterway in a recent 24-hour periods compared with a pre-war average of around 140, leaving hundreds of ships and thousands of seafarers stranded in the Gulf. This has reinforced the importance of strategic chokepoints as a macro-financial risk, as disruptions now feed directly into global shipping, insurance costs, supply-chain reliability and inflation expectations.
At the same time, US political risk has remained elevated, with trade policy again becoming a key source of uncertainty. The continuation of Trump’s tariff agenda has complicated corporate planning, strained relations with allies and reinforced concerns around policy unpredictability, while the unresolved legal and political disputes around tariff refunds have added another layer of uncertainty for large importers. From there, the trade-policy debate naturally extends to the broader US-China conflict, where tariffs, export controls, critical minerals, manufacturing reshoring and technology restrictions remain central points of tension. Trump’s China tariffs helped reduce the US goods trade deficit with China in 2025, but did not materially change China’s industrial policy, while renewed disputes in 2026 have kept the relationship fragile ahead of further negotiations.

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RESEARCH PERSPECTIVE VOL. 274 April 2026 Alternative Markets Update Since the beginning of 2026, geopolitics has increasingly moved back to the centre of financial-market risk, led by the escalation between the US and Iran. The conflict has shifted from a regional military confrontation into a broader threat to global trade infrastructure, with Iran using asymmetric naval tactics, including fast boats, vessel seizures and threats around the Strait of Hormuz, while the US has responded with a naval blockade and efforts to secure maritime corridors. Shipping traffic through the strait has fallen sharply, with reports indicating that only a few ships passed through the waterway in a recent 24-hour periods compared with a pre-war average of around 140, leaving hundreds of ships and thousands of seafarers stranded in the Gulf. This has reinforced the importance of strategic chokepoints as a macro-financial risk, as disruptions now feed directly into global shipping, insurance costs, supply-chain reliability and inflation expectations. At the same time, US political risk has remained elevated, with trade policy again becoming a key source of uncertainty. The continuation of Trump’s tariff agenda has complicated corporate planning, strained relations with allies and reinforced concerns around policy unpredictability, while the unresolved legal and political disputes around tariff refunds have added another layer of uncertainty for large importers. From there, the trade-policy debate naturally extends to the broader US-China conflict, where tariffs, export controls, critical minerals, manufacturing reshoring and technology restrictions remain central points of tension. Trump’s China tariffs helped reduce the US goods trade deficit with China in 2025, but did not materially change China’s industrial policy, while renewed disputes in 2026 have kept the relationship fragile ahead of further negotiations. In Europe, the geopolitical backdrop has also reinforced the push towards higher defence spending, with NATO reporting that European allies and Canada increased defence expenditure by 20% in real terms in 2025, supporting defence and aerospace sectors but also adding to fiscal pressures at a time of weak growth and elevated borrowing costs. The most immediate market transmission from the Iran conflict has been through the Strait of Hormuz, which has turned energy security into the central commodity theme of 2026 so far. As shown in Figure 1, crude oil is currently up around 70% YTD, as investors priced in the risk of disrupted tanker flows, higher insurance costs, and potential supply shortages across one of the world’s most important energy chokepoints. European natural gas has followed a similar pattern, rising by around 60% YTD and temporarily gaining as much as 120% during the height of the Iran war, reflecting Europe’s greater exposure to seaborne LNG markets, disrupted Gulf supply routes, and renewed concerns over storage replenishment. By contrast, US natural gas has been far less affected by the Iran shock, as Henry Hub remains primarily driven by domestic weather, production, and inventories. After briefly spiking by around 100% at the end of January due to severe cold weather and freeze-offs, US gas has since reversed and is now down roughly 30% YTD. Figure 1: Indexed Crude Oil and Natural Gas Prices Since the Beginning of 2026, Source: Investing.com, April 2026 Following the sharp moves in oil and gas, uranium provides the natural bridge into the broader commodity complex. As shown in Figure 2, uranium is currently still up around 5% to 10% YTD, but the most notable move came in late February, when prices briefly surged and were up around 25% YTD, driven by renewed attention to nuclear energy security, tightening long-term supply, and utilities moving to lock in future supply contracts at higher prices. During that time, uranium has moved back into focus as demand tightens and utilities seek longer-term supply, while supply concerns remain visible in Kazakhstan and Canada. After the subsequent decline, uranium has traded relatively steadily, suggesting that the market has retained a structural support narrative even as the speculative premium faded. Gold and silver followed a more volatile pattern. Both are still up around 5% to 10% YTD, but silver briefly spiked by more than 60% in late January before falling back towards a 20% gain, reflecting a parabolic rally after an already exceptional 2025, followed by forced deleveraging, margin pressure and profit-taking. In this timeframe, silver rose by more than 50% in January before falling sharply in late January, while gold moved in the same direction but less violently. Gold also experienced a significant correction despite its safe-haven role, as the Iran war lifted inflation and rate expectations, supported the US dollar and real yields, and forced investors to unwind leveraged positions in liquid assets. Copper, by contrast, has been more stable. It moved relatively sideways during the early months of the year, weakened slightly during the Iran war as higher energy prices raised concerns around inflation, demand and financial conditions, but has since recovered as markets priced in a partial easing of geopolitical risk and continued medium-term demand from electrification, grid investment and data-centre infrastructure. Figure 2: Indexed Performance of Gold, Silver, Copper & Uranium Since the Beginning of 2026, Source: Investing.com, April 2026 Following the geopolitical and commodity shock, the macroeconomic narrative has shifted decisively back towards inflation. While 2025 was defined by gradual disinflation and a growing willingness among central banks to ease policy, 2026 has so far been characterised by renewed upside risks to prices. The transmission channel is relatively clear. The Iran war has disrupted energy markets and global shipping routes, while higher oil, European gas prices, freight costs and tariffs have increased the risk that headline inflation accelerates again. Importantly, the concern is no longer limited to the immediate impact of higher energy prices, but whether these shocks pass through into core inflation, corporate pricing behaviour, wage demands and longer-term inflation expectations. Across regions, the renewed inflation risk follows the same broad logic, but the transmission channels differ. In the US, the inflation impulse is less directly tied to natural gas because domestic production and the more insulated Henry Hub market provide a buffer, although higher crude oil still feeds into gasoline, transport, logistics and consumer expectations. In the euro area, the risk is more directly linked to energy security, as dependence on imported energy and LNG makes higher gas prices a more immediate pressure point for household bills, industrial input costs and fiscal support needs. More specifically, this led to rising inflation in both economies, as shown in Figure 3. US inflation rose by 90bps to 3.3%, while inflation in the euro area increased by 70bps to 2.6%. Inflation is likely to stay elevated in the near-term, as long as the war in Iran is not officially resumed. Due to the stickiness of prior inflation, inflation is likely not falling immediately. As a consequence, market participants expect one cut with a low probability and most likely no cut for the Fed interest rate in 2026, compared to 2-3 cuts before the Iran war. In Europe, the situation is even less clear with opinions ranging from rate cuts (low probability) to no changes or even multiple rate hikes. Figure 3: Inflation in the US and Euro Area & Federal Fund Rate and ECB Deposit Facility Rate Since January 2025, Source: TradingEconomics, Federal Reserve & European Central Banks, April 2026 Labour markets remain important, but they are no longer the main policy variable in the way they were during late 2025. At that time, with inflation appearing more contained, central banks were increasingly focused on whether rising unemployment and softer hiring justified rate cuts. In 2026, the focus has shifted back towards inflation. Employment data still matters, especially because wage growth determines whether inflation becomes embedded, but central banks are now less likely to respond aggressively to labour-market weakness if inflation expectations are moving higher at the same time. The growth impact is the other side of the same shock. Higher energy prices act like a tax on consumers and businesses, reducing disposable income, raising production costs and weighing on confidence. The US economy appears better positioned to absorb this pressure, supported by domestic energy production, stronger corporate balance sheets and more resilient demand. Europe is more vulnerable, given weaker underlying growth, higher imported energy exposure and limited fiscal flexibility. As a result, the macro environment has become more stagflationary in character. Inflation risks have risen, while growth momentum has become more fragile. Equity markets entered 2026 on a relatively strong footing, although performance was uneven across regions. By the end of February, US equities were broadly flat, while Europe and China had gained around 5% and Japan had rallied by approximately 15%, supported by continued foreign inflows, corporate reform momentum and a weaker yen. The outbreak of the Iran war then triggered a sharp risk-off phase, as investors reassessed the impact of higher energy prices, supply-chain disruption, inflation risk and reduced central-bank flexibility. At the lows, US equities had fallen to around -7% YTD, Europe and China declined to roughly -5%, and Japan gave back almost all of its earlier gains. However, the correction proved relatively short-lived. At the time of writing, equity markets have rebounded strongly, with Japan up around 18% YTD, while the US, Europe and China are all up between 3% and 5%. Figure 4 shows the performance dynamics of 2026 thus far. This recovery suggests that investors have so far treated the Iran shock as a severe but manageable macro disruption rather than the start of a broader earnings recession, although equity markets remain highly sensitive to renewed escalation, energy prices and the path of policy rates. Figure 4: Indexed Performance of the S&P 500, Euro Stoxx 50, Nikkei 225 & Shanghai Composite Since the Beginning of 2026, Source: Investing.com, April 2026 Cryptocurrencies also began 2026 strongly, extending the momentum from the prior year until early February, when the market entered a sharp correction. The sell-off was mainly driven by broader risk-off sentiment across technology and high-growth assets, ETF outflows, weaker institutional demand and the unwind of leveraged positions, rather than a crypto-specific structural shock. At the lows, Bitcoin had fallen by around 30% YTD, while Ethereum and Solana declined by roughly 40%, reflecting the higher beta of altcoins in periods of tighter liquidity. Until early April, cryptocurrencies remained close to these depressed levels, with the Iran war having only limited additional impact. Since then, digital assets have rallied alongside equities, supported by improving risk sentiment and hopes of geopolitical stabilisation. At the time of writing, Bitcoin is down only around 10% YTD, Ethereum remains down around 20%, while Solana has failed to fully join the rebound and is still down roughly 30%. Figure 5: YTD of Bitcoin, Ethereum, and Solana, Source: CoinMarketCap, April 2026 Hedge Funds Hedge funds entered 2026 with strong momentum after a solid 2025, supported by improved performance, renewed investor confidence and a more attractive opportunity set across rates, commodities, currencies and equities. However, the escalation of the Iran war in March created the first major stress test of the year, as the energy shock, inflation repricing, higher-rate expectations and equity-market sell-off pressured performance across the industry. Hedge funds were not immune to this volatility, particularly those with higher equity beta, exposure to crowded risk trades or leverage-sensitive positions. However, the drawdown was still more contained than many directional risk assets, reinforcing the role of hedge funds as a potentially stabilising allocation in more uncertain market environments. Rather than undermining the broader case for the asset class, the March episode highlighted the importance of manager selection, risk management and the ability to adjust exposures quickly during periods of geopolitical stress. Despite the March drawdown, investor demand for hedge funds has remained resilient. This is important because it suggests that allocators are not viewing recent volatility as a reason to reduce exposure, but rather as confirmation that flexible, actively managed strategies remain useful in a more complex macro environment. Higher inflation uncertainty, unstable rate expectations, geopolitical shocks and greater cross-asset dispersion all support the institutional case for hedge funds, particularly when traditional equity-bond diversification is less reliable. Industry flows have remained positive, with capital continuing to favour managers that can demonstrate downside control, differentiated alpha and liquidity. At the same time, April results are expected to be strong, helped by the rebound in equities and improving risk sentiment. In short, hedge funds suffered during the March shock, but the industry has so far retained investor confidence and appears well positioned to benefit from a more volatile market regime. Strategy dispersion has become one of the key themes of 2026. Equity hedge and emerging-market strategies were among the more exposed areas during the March sell-off, as risk assets declined and geopolitical uncertainty weighed on investor sentiment. However, equity long/short managers may also benefit from the sharp regional and sector dispersion that has followed, particularly across Japan, China, Europe, energy, defence and technology. Macro, commodity and credit-oriented strategies appear especially relevant in the current environment, given large moves in oil, European gas, precious metals, currencies, yield curves and credit spreads. These conditions create opportunities for skilled managers to monetise dislocations, relative-value trades and directional trends. At the same time, the environment is not uniformly favourable. These include sharp reversals in commodities, policy-sensitive rate moves and crowded positioning can quickly turn opportunities into drawdowns. Overall, 2026 has rewarded flexibility and active risk management more than static market exposure.   Private Equity & Venture Capital Private equity entered 2026 with a more constructive backdrop, but the recovery remains selective rather than broad-based. After a difficult period in 2024 and 2025, dealmaking and exit activity have improved, helped by more stable financing markets, greater valuation realism and renewed buyer confidence. However, the recovery is still concentrated in larger, higher-quality assets, while mid-market transactions and more leveraged deals remain more difficult. The central bottleneck continues to be exits and distributions. Many limited partners are still waiting for cash to be returned from older vintages before committing more aggressively to new funds, which keeps fundraising pressure elevated, especially for smaller and less established managers. As a result, private equity is no longer frozen, but it has not returned to the easy conditions of the previous cycle. Overall, activity has gained traction but remains uneven and constrained by persistent liquidity issues. The IPO market has become the main source of optimism for both private equity and venture capital, as a more active listing environment could help unlock distributions, validate private-market valuations and rebuild LP confidence. However, the reopening remains highly selective. Large, profitable or strategically important companies are best positioned to access public markets, while smaller businesses and companies with weaker profitability profiles may still struggle to list on attractive terms. This is particularly relevant given the expected pipeline of large private companies, including names such as SpaceX, OpenAI and Anthropic, which could materially improve sentiment if successful. At the same time, very large IPOs may absorb a significant amount of available public-market capital, making the market less supportive for less prominent issuers. The key point is therefore that the exit window is improving, but it is still concentrated in high-quality and large-cap opportunities rather than representing a full reopening of public markets. Venture capital has shown the strongest headline recovery, but the improvement is overwhelmingly driven by artificial intelligence. As shown in Figure 6, global VC deal value reached a record $330.9bn in Q1 2026, largely supported by AI megadeals, while the US alone attracted $267.2bn of VC investment with a striking concentration during the quarter. OpenAI raised $122bn, Anthropic $30.6bn, xAI $20bn and Waymo $16bn, meaning that a small number of AI-related companies accounted for a very large share of total market activity. It is also noteworthy that total deal volume fell to the lowest levels since the beginning of 2020. This makes the VC recovery more fragile than the headline figures suggest, as many non-AI startups, later-stage companies and businesses without clear profitability paths still face a difficult fundraising and exit environment. Overall, private markets are reopening, but 2026 is not a broad return to the 2021 boom. Instead, capital is flowing disproportionately towards the largest, highest-quality and most strategically important assets. Figure 6: Quarterly Venture Capital Deal Value Since Q1 2020 to Q1 2026 & Share of Large AI Deals in Q1 2026, Source: KPMG, April 2026 Private Debt Private debt entered 2026 with its structural growth story still intact, supported by bank retrenchment, borrower demand for flexible capital, floating-rate income and institutional appetite for yield. However, the tone around the asset class has become more cautious since the beginning of the year. Instead of focusing only on continued AUM growth and the migration of lending activity from banks to private markets, investors have increasingly shifted their attention towards underwriting discipline, valuation transparency, liquidity terms and the quality of underlying borrower portfolios. This does not suggest that private debt has entered a broad crisis, but it does mark a clear change in narrative. The asset class remains attractive in a higher-rate environment, yet 2026 has become an important stress test for whether private credit can deliver stable returns while operating with less favourable macro conditions, rising refinancing pressure and greater scrutiny from investors and rating agencies. The key headline has been redemption pressure in semi-liquid private credit vehicles, most notably at Blue Owl, where investor withdrawal requests highlighted the tension between illiquid direct-lending assets and fund structures offering periodic liquidity. This has become one of the clearest pressure points in the market, as private credit assets are typically long-term and difficult to sell quickly, while some newer wealth-channel products have created expectations of more regular access to capital. Figure 7 shows the share price performance of listed private credit managers, including Blue Owl, Ares, Apollo and Blackstone. While the recent market recovery has helped, several private credit-related companies remain down around 20% to 40% from their prior levels, leaving them far below where they traded before the current private credit stress emerged. The chart therefore captures not only company-specific concerns, but also a broader repricing of liquidity, transparency and credit-cycle risk across the sector. Figure 7: YTD Performance of Selected Publicly Traded Private Credit Focused Companies, Source: Investing.com, April 2026 At the same time, credit quality concerns are rising, although the market has not yet moved into a broad default cycle. Higher rates, slower growth, tighter refinancing conditions and pressure on more leveraged middle-market borrowers are increasing the risk of restructurings, maturity extensions and distressed exchanges. Software exposure has also become a more specific concern, as AI disruption may weaken the growth outlook for some recurring-revenue borrowers that were previously viewed as relatively defensive. Banks remain indirectly exposed through fund finance, leverage facilities and lending relationships with non-bank credit platforms, although the risk still appears more contained than systemic. Fundraising has remained resilient, but investors are becoming more selective, favouring larger managers with strong origination, conservative underwriting and credible workout capabilities. Credit secondaries are also becoming more important as a liquidity outlet, helping investors rebalance portfolios while potentially revealing valuation gaps. Overall, private debt remains structurally supported, but 2026 has exposed the difference between high-quality lending platforms and weaker, more liquidity-sensitive structures. 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